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1 Introduction
Changes in aggregate labor market outcomes (employment/unemployment) hide a large vari-
ation in gross worker flows.1 In particular, the contribution of ins and outs of unemployment
to the dynamics of unemployment has been debated since the eighties, initially in the US and
subsequently in other developed countries. More recently, focusing on transition rates, Hall
(2006) and Shimer (2012)2 report that the job finding rate provides the key to understanding
the fluctuations in the U.S unemployment rate. By contrast, Fujita and Ramey (2009) and
Elsby et al. (2009) show that the separation rate accounts for almost half the variation in
unemployment and leads to cyclical changes in unemployment. Drawing on data for three
Western European countries, the findings reported by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008) are
in line with those reported in these last two papers. Specifically, using the Spanish Labor
Force Survey (SLFS), they find that inflows and outflows of unemployment contribute in
almost equal parts to the country’s unemployment volatility. Smith (2011), exploiting the
British Household Panel Survey and using a decomposition based on actual unemployment
instead of steady state unemployment, finds that during recessions the separation rate drives
unemployment. However, in periods of moderation, she finds that the role played by the job
finding rate acquires greater relevance.
In common with many other European countries over the last few decades, Spain imple-
mented a labor market reform (1984) that gave greater flexibility to the use of fixed-term
contracts and maintained a relatively high level of employment protection for permanent
employees. As a result, the Spanish labor market has been characterized by an intensive use
of temporary work, which has in turn increased the volume of worker flows (via hiring and
firing).
This paper aims to shed some light on the dynamics of the Spanish labor market, using
data from the SLFS over the last twenty-three years (from the third quarter of 1987 to the
second quarter of 2010). More specifically, our paper analyzes the dynamics of the Spanish
labor market by explicitly considering this employment duality (fixed-term contracts, on the
one hand, and permanent employment, on the other).
Our paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we analyze the flow
1See for instance, Abowd and Zellner (1985), Blanchard and Diamond (1990) and Davies et al. (2006).
2The first version of this paper appears on 16 January 2005.
data from the SLFS by explicitly considering the employment duality in the Spanish labor
market, which can be considered a useful point of reference for other dual labor markets.
Second, the period of analysis considered here offers additional advantages to those provided
in previous empirical studies of Spain (eg. Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2008). Specifically,
our period covers two complete business cycles: two periods of expansion (1987-1992 and
1995-2007) and two of recession (1993-1994 and 2008-2010). Finally, as regards our analysis
of the current downturn (the most severe recession in developed countries since World War
II), the Spanish perspective is interesting given the different responses of the labor market
outcomes compared to those in other European labor markets (see Bentolila et al., 2010).
For descriptive purposes, we first conduct a flow analysis of the Spanish labor market
focusing on its gross worker flows. Then, in line with the most recent literature, we turn to
examine transition rates. More specifically, we study the dynamics of the labor market in
a three-state set-up (employment, unemployment and inactivity) and in a four-state set-up
that takes into account the employment dualism of the Spanish labor market (employment
- both permanent and temporary, unemployment and inactivity). Second, we compare the
transition rates in Spain with those found in two more flexible labor markets, namely those
in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). Third, to analyze business cycle
behavior, we examine the comovement between GDP and the transition rates using both un-
conditional cross-correlations and conditional correlation coefficients of vector autoregression
(VAR) forecast errors at different forecast horizons as proposed by den Haan (2000). Finally,
we present a decomposition of the relative importance of the transition rates to equilibrium
unemployment dynamics in a four-state set-up (i.e. explicitly considering the employment
duality of the Spanish labor market) using two different methodologies.
All our analyses point to a broadly similar conclusion. The employment duality is the
key to understanding the unemployment volatility and the functioning of the Spanish labor
market. Specifically, we find that the predominance of employees with fixed-term contracts
appears to account for the employment-unemployment movements. In general, Spain’s tran-
sition rates are lower than those recorded in the UK and US. We also find a positive (negative)
and strong relationship between economic activity and transition rates from unemployment
to temporary employment (from temporary employment to unemployment) over the business
cycle. These results are consistent with the fact that firms use fixed-term contracts as the
main channel for hiring and firing workers. Finally, we find that the transition rates involving
temporary employment account for most of the fluctuations in the unemployment rate.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section two, we introduce the database
and explain the methodology. Section three presents our analysis of the transition rates. The
business cycle properties of these transition rates are presented in section four. Section five
considers a decomposition of unemployment fluctuations and section six concludes.
2 Database and Methodology
2.1 Database
2.1.1 Data: Labor Force Survey - Flows
The SLFS rotating quarterly survey is conducted by the Spanish National Statistical In-
stitute (Instituto Nacional de Estadstica, INE). The sample size of the SLFS consists of
approximately 65,000 households per period (about 180,000 adult individuals) drawn from
the population living in family dwellings in the Spanish national territory. The main goal of
the Survey is to reveal the characteristics of that population with regard to the labor market.
The interviewers contact respondents either in person or by telephone. The total sample is
divided into six sub-samples called rotation groups. Each household remains in the sample
for six periods, and a sixth is renewed each quarter. This means that in any two consecutive
quarters there are five overlapping rotation groups. In theory, owing to this rotation scheme,
five sixths of the sample in any two consecutive quarters can be matched.
Taking into account the structure of this database, we can obtain the gross labor market
flows by calculating the quarter-on-quarter transitions made by individual workers between
different labor market states. Specifically, we obtain the gross flows using a four-state model
(permanent employment, temporary employment, unemployment, and inactivity).3
Our use of the survey data to construct these flows encounters two main problems. First,
temporary or permanent attrition makes it impossible to match all individual workers across
quarters (i.e. a margin of error) which leads to the omission of possible transitions from the
survey data. For the SLFS, the unconditional non-responses vary from 7 to 17 percent in
the first and sixth waves respectively.4 We solve this problem using the missing-at-random
3Our definition of temporary employment consider all workers with a fixed-term contract. All other
workers (including the self-employed) are included within permanent employees.
4For an in-depth analysis of sample attrition when using the SLFS, see Jimenez and Peracchi, 2002.
method which drops the missing observations and re-weights the measured transitions. The
second problem concerns the point-in-time measurement of worker status, which fails to
capture transitions within the period (quarters). For instance, if a worker is employed in the
first month of the quarter, loses her job in the second and is reemployed in the third, our
quarterly data do not detect any of those transitions. However, the multiple transitions within
the period can be overcome by calculating the weekly transition rates from the observed
quarterly rates (for details see sub-section 2.2).
2.1.2 Descriptive Analysis: Average Gross Flows
Figure 1 summarizes the quarterly average worker flows between the four labor market states
temporary employment, permanent employment, unemployment and inactivity. The numbers
within the circles indicate the stock of workers in each state; the numbers next to the arrows
indicate the volume of the flows in millions of individuals and the corresponding percentage
of the working-age population is given in parentheses.
Figure 1: Quarterly Average Gross Worker Flows, 1987:3-2010:2
Employed-Permanent 
11.56 million 
Unemployed 
2.82 million 
Out of the labour force 
15.34 million 
0.056 
(0.17) 
0.191 
(0.57) 
0.222 
(0.66) 
0.082 
(0.24) 
0.108 
(0.32) 
Employed-Fixed Term 
3.76 million 
0.251 
(0.75) 
0.183 
(0.54) 
0.092 
(0.27) 
0.129  
(0.38) 
0.298 
(0.89) 
0.247 
(0.73) 
0.045 
(0.13) 
Notes: The gross flows are expressed in millions of workers. Worker flows are expressed as a
percentage of working age population in parentheses.
Source: Own elaboration based on Spanish Labor Force Survey (INE).
Over the whole period, net employment increased by an average of 0.028 million per
quarter, representing 0.08 percent of the working-age population. Underlying this net increase
in total employment were various flows that serve to describe the main characteristics of
the Spanish labor market (eg. the predominance of employees with fixed-term contracts in
explaining unemployment movements, according to our calculations, almost 85 percent of
worker flows, between employment and unemployment, involve a fixed-term contract).
Figure 1 also shows that every quarter an average of 0.3 million workers moved from
unemployment to temporary employment and 0.25 million workers moved in the opposite
direction. By contrast, the flows from unemployment to permanent employment were much
lower, with an average of 0.056 million individuals moving each quarter to unemployment and
0.045 million moving in the other direction. In addition to these flows between unemployment
and both types of employment, a significant number of workers also moved between temporary
and permanent employment. Specifically, an average of 0.25 million workers moved each
quarter from temporary to permanent employment, while the flows in the opposite direction
reached 0.18 million. The relative magnitude of these transitions from unemployment to
both types of employment and between the two employment states gives us an idea of how
the Spanish labor market creates employment and, in particular, permanent employment.
Most firms hire workers initially on fixed-term contracts and some of these subsequently
become permanent. This indirect way of obtaining a permanent job can be directly related
to some of the policy measures included in the labor market reforms carried out before
and during our period of study. After the 1984 reform (which introduced differences in the
hiring and firing costs of fixed-term and permanent contracts), the subsequent labor market
reforms (1997, 2001 and 2006) sought to provide more stable employment by reducing the
proportion of temporary contracts. To achieve this, successive governments have used tax
incentives (rebates on social security contributions) and reductions in firing costs (permanent
employment promotion contract with low severance pay for unfair dismissals) as the main
instruments for promoting the conversion of fixed-term into permanent contracts.
The flexibility of the temporary margin, however, seems to have had relatively less impact
on the relationship between employment and inactivity since only 46.2 percent of the flows
between these two states involved fixed-term contracts. In terms of gross flows, an average of
0.092 million workers moved each quarter from inactivity to permanent employment and 0.129
million workers moved in the opposite direction. From inactivity to temporary employment
and vice versa, gross flows were 0.108 and 0.082 respectively (see Figure 1).
This descriptive analysis of gross worker flows serves to highlight the relative importance
of employment duality in the overall dynamics of the Spanish labor market.
2.2 Methodology: Dual Labor Market Dynamics
Labor market dynamics and, in particular, the flows between different labor market states
have been studied by using to two main approaches: first, by analyzing gross worker flows
(Abowd and Zellner (1985), Blanchard and Diamond (1990), Davies et al. (2006)) and,
second, by focusing specifically on transition rates (Hall (2006), Elsby et al. (2009), Fujita
and Ramey (2009), Smith(2011) and Shimer (2012)). Here, following the approach adopted
by most recent studies, we focus our study on transition rates.
Below we present the fundamental expressions that describe the dynamics of the Spanish
labor market. In addition to the states of unemployment (U) and inactivity (or out of the
labor force) status (I), we explicitly consider the two-tier structure of Spain’s labor market
in these equations. Two types of contract characterize this duality: fixed-term (Ef ) and
permanent (Ep).5 Thus, the dynamics of this four-state model, as a function of the transition
rates ΛX−Yt , evolve according to the following difference equations:
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where ΛX−Yt represents the transition rate from state X in period t− 1 to state Y in period
t.6 These transition rates (between period t − 1 and t) are calculated as a fraction of the
flows from X to Y and the number of individuals in state X at t − 1. For instance, the
transition rate between unemployment and temporary employment ΛU−E
f
t is calculated as
NU−E
f
t /Ut−1.
5See Bentolila et al. (2008) and Cebrian et al. (2011) for a detailed description of the duality of the labor
market in Spain.
6When we refer to X − Y , we are in fact referring to the transition from state X in period t− 1 to state
Y in period t, where X and Y {Ep, Ef , U, I}.
As discussed above, these transition rates may present time aggregation bias since they
fail to capture the presence of multiple transitions within a period. To overcome this problem,
we calculate the weekly transition rates from the observed quarterly rates in our four-state
model.7 More specifically, we first compute the monthly (m) transition rates using the
unadjusted quarterly transition rates and the system of equations described in 5. Then,
using these monthly transition rates and the system of equations described in equation 6,
we compute the weekly (w) transition rates.8 Once we have the weekly transition rates, we
multiply them by 12 (4× 3) to obtain the corrected quarterly transition rates.910
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3 Worker Transitions in the Spanish Labor Market
Bellow we analyze the dynamics of the Spanish labor market using transition rates in a four-
state set-up, focusing above all on the behavior of these transition rates during the current
economic crisis.
Labor market outcomes are not constant over time (see Figure 2). In particular, the cur-
rent economic crisis has led to a significant deterioration in Spain’s labor market conditions.
While the real GDP in Spain fell 4.3 percent from the second quarter of 2008 to the second
quarter of 2010, unemployment more than doubled and employment was down by almost 10
percent. Specifically, the number of unemployed workers increased by more than 2.2 million
from the beginning of the recession to the second quarter of 2010 and employment fell by 1.9
7We thank Pedro Gomes for providing us with his MATLAB codes for the analysis of the UK labor market
in a three-state model.
8We are assuming that status does not change within a week. This assumption is consistent with the
Spanish Statistics Office definition that defines an individual’s status in the labor market according to the
status reported in a given week.
9In addition, we calculate the continuous time transition rates (or hazard rates) by applying the discrete
correction several times. That is, for each iteration we divide time by one third until the series converge to a
constant value (after ten interactions). Likewise, when we corrected the aggregation bias using the continuous
time correction proposed by Shimer (2012) and the results were practically the same. The average correlation
between rates was 0.99 and the means were not statistically significant different. Since the difference between
the corrected transition rates and the hazard rates, obtained using both continuous corrections, was negligible,
we opted to use the former.
10For a discussion of the pros and cons of employing discrete or continuous time correction for time
aggregation bias, see sub-section I.C. in Elsby et al. (2009).
million workers in the same period. The panel on the right-hand side of Figure 2 shows the
relative importance of the current downturn (via the cumulative deviations in the employ-
ment and participation rates from their respective trends), comparing behavior during the
current downturn and that of the nineties. Figure 2 also shows that the increase in unem-
ployment in both recessions was mirrored by a fall in employment. However, we observe a
different trend in the labor force participation rate. Specifically, at the beginning of the crisis
of the nineties the participation rate fell (exhibiting pro-cyclicality), while at the beginning
of the current crisis the labor force participation increased. Our subsequent analysis seeks to
understand the transitions between the different labor market states underlying these large
aggregate changes.
Figure 2: Employment and Unemployment, 1987:2-2010:2 and The Cumulative Deviations
of the Employment and Participation Rates from their Respective Trends (1991:3-1994:1 and
2008:3-2010:2)
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Table 1 shows the transition rates over the entire period and also for the last two periods
of expansion (1987:3-1992:1 and 1995:1-2008:1) and the last two recessions (1992:2-1994:4
and 2008:2-2010:2). Over the whole period, the transition rates that include temporary
employment and unemployment are highest (U -Ef and Ef -U). By contrast, the rates that
include permanent employment and unemployment are among the lowest ones (Ep-U and
U -Ep).
The transition rates also differ markedly across the periods. Our calculations show that
during the current recession the transition rate from permanent employment to unemploy-
ment more than doubled with respect to the previous period of economic expansion (from
0.35 to 0.85) and increased 47 percent with respect to the rate recorded during the crisis
of the nineties (0.58 and 0.85). The destruction of fixed-term contracts shows a similar
trend in these two periods; the transition rate rose from 7.21 (1995:1-2008:1) and from 9.49
(1992:2-1994:4) to 11.17 in the current period of recession.
Table 1: Transition Rates
Quarterly Average 1987:3-2010:2 (in percentages)
Ep-U Ep-I U-Ep U-I I-Ep I-U Ep-Ef Ef-Ep U-Ef Ef-U I-Ef Ef-I
Average 0.48 1.08 1.33 8.02 0.58 1.60 1.70 7.56 13.60 8.28 0.66 1.99
87:3-92:1 0.58 0.99 1.76 4.35 0.52 1.03 2.49 11.70 10.06 9.22 0.45 1.78
92:2-94:4 0.58 1.05 1.02 6.19 0.44 1.67 1.63 5.92 8.73 9.49 0.35 1.48
95:1-08:1 0.35 1.04 1.21 9.35 0.57 1.59 1.45 6.21 15.67 7.21 0.78 2.05
08:2-10:2 0.85 1.55 1.49 10.19 0.97 2.82 1.58 8.85 14.81 11.17 0.80 2.72
Notes: Ep represents permanent employment; U unemployment; I Inactivity and; Ef tempo-
rary employment. When we refer to X − Y , we are in fact referring to the transition from
state X to state Y. We divide the period into two sub-periods of expansion (1987:3-1992:1 and
1995:1-2008:1) and two of recession (1992:2-1994:4 and 2008:2-2010:2). All transition rates are
corrected for time aggregation bias using the discrete method presented in section 2.2
Source: Own elaboration using Spanish Labor Force Survey (INE).
The dynamics of the transition rates between permanent employment, temporary employ-
ment and unemployment can be seen in Figure 3. This Figure shows the evolution of the job
separation and job finding rates for both, permanent and temporary employment. Despite
the different impact that these two rates can have on unemployment, at the beginning of the
crisis separation rates began to grow, while a few quarters later the job finding rates fell.
This behavior was observed in both the crisis of the nineties as well as the current crisis. In
addition, the magnitude of these changes was much greater among temporary jobs than it
was among permanent posts.
Based on our results of the evolution in the ins and outs of unemployment, it would seem
that the rise in aggregate unemployment (and the decline in aggregate employment) during
the last two labor market crises might be explained both by a rise in separations and a fall
in the number of workers being hired.
Figure 3: Job Separation and Job Finding Rates from Permanent and Temporary Jobs
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Source: Own elaboration from Spanish Labor Force Survey (INE).
Having presented the results for Spain, it is of interest to compare these figures with
empirical evidence from other countries. To put our calculations in context, Table 2 compares
our transition rates results with the empirical evidence for the UK and the US.11
As expected, most of the transition rates are greater in labor markets with a higher levels
of overall flexibility. Specifically, the transition rate between unemployment and employment
is much lower for Spain than it is for the UK and the US (14.5, 34.6 and 32.4 percent,
respectively). Similarly, the average quarterly transition rates between employment and
inactivity are lower in Spain than they are in the UK and the US (1.8, 2.6 and 9.6 percent
of the working age population, respectively). The exception is the transition rate between
employment and unemployment. Table 2 shows that this rate is higher in Spain than it is
in the UK and the US (2.2 and 1.8 percent, respectively). This higher transition rate can
be accounted for primarily by the prevalence of temporary contracts - specifically, while the
transition from permanent employment to unemployment is low (0.4 percent), the transition
from temporary employment to unemployment is one of the highest (8.0 percent).12
As discussed above, for the unemployed in Spain finding a job is much more difficult than
it is for their counterparts in both the UK and the US (the transition rate from U to E in
Spain is 14.5 percent while in the UK and the US it is 34.6 and 32.4 percent, respectively).
In our analysis, we differentiate therefore between transitions that involve temporary and
11This comparison is limited to the period 1993 to 2010.
12Temporary employment represents almost 25 percent of Spain’s total employment.
permanent employment. Table 2 shows that the transition rates from unemployment to
employment is largely explained by the transition rates from unemployment to temporary
employment. Specifically, the transition rate from unemployment to temporary employment
(14.7 percent) is much higher than that from unemployment to permanent employment (1.2
percent).
Table 2: Transition Rates, Spain, UK and US
Quarterly Average 1993-2010 (in percentages)
Spain UK US
E − U 2.2 1.8 1.8
U − E 14.5 34.6 32.4
E − I 2.0 1.9 2.7
I − E 2.1 5.6 4.3
U − I 9.0 24.2 29.1
I − U 1.7 7.1 3.5
Ep− U 0.4
Ep− I 1.1
U − Ep 1.2
I − Ep 0.6
Ep− Ef 1.5
Ef − Ep 6.5
U − Ef 14.7
Ef − U 8.0
I − Ef 0.7
Ef − I 2.1
Source: For Spain, own elaboration using SLFS. The transition rates for the UK were taken
from data constructed by Pedro Gomes and, those for the US, from the data available at the
Robert Shimer’s web page. For additional details, see Gomes (2012) and Shimer (2012).
A further finding of interest for the Spanish case is the relatively low transition rate from
unemployment to finding oneself out of the labor force (9.0 percent compared to 24.2 percent
in the UK and 29.1 percent in the US). This result, combined with the fact that the U to
E transition rate is also lower in Spain, is one of the elements that might explain the high
persistence of Spain’s unemployment rate.
Finally, in line with the transition from unemployment to employment, the transition rate
from inactivity to employment is higher in the UK and in the US (5.6 and 4.3 percent for
the UK and the US and 2.1 percent for Spain). However, the transition rate in the opposite
direction is similar in Spain and the UK (around 2 percent) but somewhat higher in the US
(2.7 percent).
4 Business Cycle Properties of Transition Rates
Having presented the results of the gross worker flows and the transition rates, in this section
we assess the properties of these transition rates at business cycle frequencies. First, we
calculate unconditional cross correlations with output at four leads and lags. Second, we an-
alyze the dynamics of the transition rates in different time periods, and calculate conditional
correlations of VAR forecast errors at different horizons.
4.1 Unconditional Correlations
Table 3 shows the cyclical correlation of transition probabilities between unemployment,
employment and inactivity with Gross Domestic Product (GDP ) at leads and lags of up
to four quarters. We obtain the cyclical component of the series, which has been logged
previously, using a HodrickPrescott (HP) filter with a standard smoothing parameter of 1600
for quarterly data. Thus, when we refer to a variable x, we actually refer to its cyclical
component as just defined.
First, our results show that GDP leads the cyclical behavior in most of the transition
rates, given that their correlations reach their maximum (in absolute values) at lags. This
result suggests that the labor market trails the business cycle.
Second, special attention should be paid to the correlations between GDP and the tran-
sitions from unemployment to both types of employment (temporary and permanent). The
correlation between the transition rate from unemployment to temporary jobs (U −Ef ) and
GDP peaks at 0.678 at a lead of one quarter, while the correlation between the transition
rate from temporary jobs to unemployment Ef−U and GDP peaks at -0.724 at a lag of two.
These correlations point to the pro-cyclicality of the U −Ef transition rate and the counter-
cyclicality of the Ef − U transition rate. As for the correlation between the transition rate
from permanent jobs to unemployment Ep − U and GDP , we also found a counter-cyclical
behavior with a maximum of -0.641 at one lag. However, the correlation coefficient between
the transition rate from unemployment to permanent employment (U − Ep) and GDP it
is non significant. These results are coherent with the fact that, in most cases, firms use
Table 3: Cross-correlations GDP and Transition Rates
Quarterly Average 1987:3-2010:2
GDP (t∓ i)
t− 4 t− 3 t− 2 t− 1 t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4
Ep− U −0.464∗ −0.574∗ −0.627∗ −0.641∗ −0.607∗ −0.447∗ −0.304∗ -0.161 -0.0149
Ep− I 0.130 0.108 0.089 0.063 0.066 0.093 0.079 0.089 0.065
U − Ep 0.029 0.012 -0.055 -0.062 -0.120 -0.145 -0.121 -0.146 -0.127
U − I -0.100 -0.018 0.052 0.100 0.159 0.237∗ 0.242∗ 0.238∗ 0.183
I − Ep 0.164 0.182 0.213∗ 0.216∗ 0.219∗ 0.213∗ 0.161 0.105∗ 0.013∗
I − U −0.440∗ −0.496∗ −0.505∗ −0.494∗ −0.449∗ −0.291∗ -0.198 -0.109 -0.029
Ep− Ef 0.346∗ 0.404∗ 0.448∗ 0.474∗ 0.455∗ 0.397∗ 0.293∗ 0.181 0.048
Ef − Ep 0.282∗ 0.330∗ 0.384∗ 0.379∗ 0.386∗ 0.340∗ 0.241∗ 0.183 0.047
U − Ef 0.388∗ 0.536∗ 0.639∗ 0.678∗ 0.649∗ 0.589∗ 0.415∗ 0.257∗ 0.054
Ef − U −0.669∗ −0.717∗ −0.724∗ −0.667∗ −0.566∗ −0.336∗ -0.156 -0.014 0.113
I − Ef 0.567∗ 0.662∗ 0.684∗ 0.645∗ 0.538∗ 0.436∗ 0.232∗ 0.087 0.079
Ef − I 0.237∗ 0.230∗ 0.217∗ 0.181 0.098 0.088 0.037 -0.018 -0.037
Notes: Ep represents permanent employment; U unemployment; I inactivity and; Ef temporary
employment. X − Y refers to the transition rate from state X to state Y. ∗ indicates statistical
significance at 5 percent level. Standard deviation of each time series is presented in parentheses
in column one.
Source: Own elaboration using Spanish Labor Force Survey (INE).
fixed-term contracts as the main mechanism for creating employment. The two transition
rates (between permanent and temporary jobs) move in the same direction as that of the
business cycle, indicating that these job-to-job transition rates are pro-cyclical.
Third, the correlation coefficients between GDP and the transition rates related to inac-
tivity show mixed results. On the one hand, the correlation between GDP and transition
rate between permanent employment and inactivity are much lower and, in most cases, non
significant, suggesting a-cyclical behavior as regards inactivity. On the other hand, the most
interesting cases concerning inactivity are the correlations between GDP and transition rates
from inactivity to unemployment and inactivity to temporary employment, with maximum
coefficients of -0.505 and 0.684, respectively. These two results indicate the pro- and counter-
cyclical behavior of these two transition rates.
4.2 Conditional Correlations
In this sub-section, we analyze the comovement between GDP and the transition rates using
the conditional correlation coefficients of VAR forecast errors at different forecast horizons
as proposed in den Haan (2000). This methodology has three essential advantages over the
unconditional correlation coefficients presented above. First, it can be used for stationary
as well as integrated series, so no detrending of the series is required. Second, there is a di-
rect relation between den Haan’s methodology and the impulse response function, although
it requires no identification restrictions as in the standard VAR approach. Finally, the ex-
amination of conditional correlations provides more information about the dynamics of the
comovement of variables at different horizon periods.
From a set of estimated bivariate VARs between GDP and the transition rates, we con-
struct time series for the forecast errors using the difference between subsequent realizations
and their forecasts. These time series are then used to generate the correlation coefficients.
The series are again expressed in logs but are not filtered. The VARs are estimated without
imposing the unit-root restriction and by considering linear and quadratic trends when nec-
essary. The lag length in the VAR and the deterministic components were chosen using the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Table 4 displays the correlation coefficients for a forecast
horizon of up to five years (J = 1, 2, ..., 20). We also calculate bootstrapped standard errors
based on 1000 replications to infer 95 percent confidence intervals.
Table 4: Correlation Coefficients between J -quarter-ahead Forecast Errors of GDP and
Transition Rates.
Quarterly Average 1987:3-2010:2
J Ep-U Ep-I U-Ep U-I I-Ep I-U Ep-Ef Ef-Ep U-Ef Ef-U I-Ef Ef-I
1 −.359∗ −.048 .173 .164 .050 −.357 .189 .147 .472∗ −.334∗ .065 .072
2 −.502∗ −.023 .120 .257∗ .151 −.388∗ .309∗ .244 .701∗ −.456∗ .402 .250∗
3 −.579∗ .008 .119 .343∗ .219 −.434∗ .385∗ .313 .797∗ −.485∗ .536∗ .327∗
4 −.622∗ .034 .085 .405∗ .259 −.450∗ .434∗ .362∗ .842∗ −.582∗ .654∗ .363∗
5 −.649∗ .052 .063 .448∗ .280 −.437∗ .466∗ .394∗ .865∗ −.612∗ .656∗ .375∗
6 −.665∗ .064 .036 .475∗ .289 −.457∗ .486∗ .416∗ .877∗ −.650∗ .644∗ .375∗
7 −.677∗ .072 .015 .492∗ .291 −.519∗ .499∗ .430∗ .883∗ −.682∗ .651∗ .368∗
8 −.683∗ .078 −.004 .502∗ .290 −.558∗ .507∗ .439∗ .885∗ −.715∗ .632∗ .258∗
12 −.696∗ .088 −.049 .503∗ .276 −.555∗ .520∗ .455∗ .873∗ −.709∗ .640∗ .321
16 −.701∗ .091 −.068 .498∗ .268 −.475∗ .524∗ .460∗ .860∗ −.707∗ .663∗ .302
20 −.704∗ .092 −.077 .503∗ .264 −.470∗ .527∗ .463∗ .858∗ −.720∗ .623∗ .296
Notes: ∗ indicates statistical significance at 5 percent level. Ep represents permanent employ-
ment; U unemployment; I inactivity and; Ef temporary employment. When we refer to X−Y ,
we actually refer to the transition rate from state X to state Y.
Source: Own elaboration using Spanish Labor Force Survey (INE).
First, the signs of the conditional correlation coefficients are consistent with those of the
unconditional correlations presented in Table 3. Second, the signs of the correlation coeffi-
cients between GDP and each of the labor market transition rates also remain unchanged at
different horizons, indicating a stable relationship between the economic activity and these
transition rates over the business cycle. Third, most of these correlation coefficients increase
with the forecast horizon, suggesting a persistent labor market adjustment in response to
economic innovations.
Table 4 also reveals higher coefficients in the correlations that involve states of employ-
ment (permanent and temporary) and unemployment. Thus, as discussed above, the cyclical
behavior of the transition rates between employment (in particular, temporary) and unem-
ployment is more pronounced than that of the transition rates between inactivity and the
two employment states. Moreover, the transition rate from unemployment to permanent
employment (U − Ep) shows a non significant conditional correlation coefficient with GDP
(-0.077 after 20 forecast horizons) while the correlation coefficient between GDP and the
transition rate from unemployment to temporary employment (U −Ef ) is positive and high
in absolute terms (0.858 after 20 forecast horizons). In turn, the transition rate from inac-
tivity to employment records maximum correlation coefficients of 0.623 from I to Ef and of
0.264 (non significant) from I to Ep. These results are also consistent with the fact that firms
use fixed-term contracts as their main mechanism for creating jobs. As for the process of
job destruction, we observe a similar correlation for the transition rates from temporary and
permanent employment to unemployment with maximum correlation coefficients of -0.720
for Ef − U and -0.704 for Ep − U after 20 quarters. This last result is evidence of the fact
that during recessions firms destroy not only temporary positions but also permanent jobs.
5 Contributions to fluctuations in unemployment in
dual labor market
Below we analyze the contribution of the various transition rates to the cyclical behavior of
the equilibrium unemployment rate. Several studies, including Elsby et al. (2009), Fujita and
Ramey (2009) and Shimer (2012) for the US and Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008), Smith
(2011) and Gomes (2012) for European countries, have computed the relative contributions
of job separation and job finding rates to unemployment rate variability. The aforementioned
studies all calculate the contribution to this volatility by considering transitions in two-state
(employment and unemployment) or three-state models (employment, unemployment and
inactivity). In our analysis of the contribution of the transition rates to the dynamics of
the unemployment rate, we use a four-state model. Specifically, we take into account the
employment duality of the Spanish labor market, distinguishing between the transition rates
that involve temporary employment and those that involve permanent employment.
Using equations (1)-(4), we compute the steady-states for Ep, Ef , U, I in each period by
solving the following equation system as a function of the transition rates, ΛX−Yt .
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Figure 4 compares the steady state unemployment rate usst with the actual unemployment
rate ut. This comparison suggests that both rates followed fairly similar paths throughout
the period. The largest deviations occurred when actual unemployment underwent marked
and rapid rises. Specifically, this behavior was recorded at the beginning of the last two
labor market crises, in the second quarter of 1992 and in the fourth quarter of 2008. Despite
these discrepancies, the steady state and the actual unemployment rates show a very high
correlation (0.94).
Based on this strong correlation, between the actual and the steady state unemployment
rates, we first approximate the contributions of the various transition rates to fluctuations
in unemployment using the previously calculated equilibrium unemployment rate. Following
Shimer (2012), we isolate the effect of each individual transition rate on steady state un-
employment by constructing counterfactual values for Epsst , E
f ss
t , U
ss
t and I
ss
t . In order to
calculate these counterfactuals, we allow movements over time in just one transition rate and
assume that the remaining rates are fixed at their average values (Λ
X−Y
). More specifically,
we compute the contribution of each transition rate through the coefficient from a regression
of each detrended counterfactual unemployment rate on the detrended equilibrium unemploy-
ment rate. Table 5 shows the contribution of each transition rate to unemployment volatility
in two different scenarios: i) when not considering the employment duality (column one) and
ii) in a four-state labor market model, which explicitly takes into account the employment
13For the three-state model, we calculate the steady-state for total employment E = Ep + Ef .
Figure 4: Actual and Steady State Unemployment Rates
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duality in Spain’s labor market (column two).
In order to increase the robustness of our results, we also present the results of a decom-
position that extends the methodology proposed by Fujita and Ramey (2009) to a four-state
model. More specifically, we decompose the equilibrium unemployment rate by taking a first-
order Taylor expansion around the HP-filter trend values of the hazard rates (Λ
X−Y
t ) instead
of around the constant means (Λ
X−Y
). From the first-order Taylor expansion we obtain the
following expression:
∆usst =
usst − usst
usst
=
∑
X−Y
βX−Yt (
ΛX−Yt − ΛX−Yt
Λ
X−Y
t
) + εt, (11)
where βX−Yt =
∂usst
∂Λ
X−Y
t
Λ
X−Y
t
usst
is the elasticity of the HP trend equilibrium unemployment rate
with respect to the HP trend value of the hazard rate and εt is an error term.
14 Defining the
factor ∆usst (Λ
X−Y
t ) as the contribution of the hazard rate Λ
X−Y
t to fluctuations in the equilib-
rium unemployment rate, the decomposition proposed in (11) makes possible a quantitative
assessment of unemployment variability in terms of the separate contributions of each hazard
rate, which in turn can be expressed as a proportion of total variation.
14Let us define usst (Λ
X−Y
t ) as the quarterly deviation in the equilibrium unemployment rate with respect
to its HP trend when the transition rate ΛX−Yt is also deviated from its trend and the rest of transition rates
remain at their HP trend values, then
∂usst
∂Λ
X−Y
t
=
usst (Λ
X−Y
t )−usst
ΛX−Yt −ΛX−Yt
.
χX−Y =
cov(∆usst ,∆u
ss
t (Λ
X−Y
t ))
var(∆usst )
. (12)
The contributions of the different transition rates to unemployment volatility, using the
second methodology, in the scenario of employment duality, are presented in column 3 of
Table 5.
Table 5: Unemployment Decompositions: Spain 1987-2010
Shimer Fujita and Ramey
Three States Four States Four States
E-U 0.334
Ep− U 0.168 0.176
Ef − U 0.264 0.293
U -E 0.349
U − Ep -0.006 -0.005
U − Ef 0.278 0.286
E-I -0.041
Ep− I -0.012 -0.062
Ef − I -0.005 -0.016
I-E 0.113
I − Ep 0.066 0.102
I − Ef 0.046 0.055
I-U 0.131 I-U 0.102 0.108
U -I 0.072 U -I 0.065 0.089
Ep− Ef -0.180 -0.219
Ef − Ep 0.177 0.216
Notes: We first calculate the covariance between the steady state unemployment rate usst and the
counterfactual unemployment rate assuming that all transition rates, except one, were always
at their sample average (columns 1 and 2) or at their HP trend values (column 3). We then
divide each covariance by the variance of usst . The series are detrended using a HodrickPrescott
filter with the standard quarterly smoothing parameter of 1600.
Source: Own elaboration from Spanish Labor Force Survey (INE).
In the three-state model, fluctuations in the transition rate from unemployment to em-
ployment (U − E) account for about 35 percent of the fluctuations in the unemployment
rate. A similar contribution to movements in the unemployment rate id derived from the
employment to unemployment (E − U) transition rate (33 percent). Thus, our results im-
ply that both the job finding and job separation rates are important in accounting for the
volatility in the Spanish equilibrium unemployment rate, which is in line with the findings
of Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008). The other transition rates (those involving inactivity)
make a quantitatively minor contribution to the fluctuations in unemployment.
As can be seen in columns 2 and 3 of Table 5, the results for the four-state model are
very similar when applying both methodologies. Specifically, the contribution of the E − U
transition rate increases as the contribution of the U − E transition rate decreases. Thus,
the contribution of the separation rate is much more important than that of the job finding
rate in accounting for fluctuations in Spain’s unemployment rate. Moreover, and as with the
three-state set-up, the transition rates that involve inactivity make a quantitatively minor
contribution to unemployment rate volatility. The employment duality of the Spanish labor
market is evident when we consider the transitions in the different types of employment (per-
manent and temporary) and unemployment. Specifically, almost 80 percent of movements
between unemployment and employment involve fixed-term contracts. Furthermore, our find-
ings show that the transition rate from unemployment to temporary employment (U − Ef )
accounts for all of the contribution of the aggregate job finding rate to fluctuations in the
unemployment rate. Moreover, the transition rate from temporary jobs to unemployment
is responsible for more than 60 percent of the fluctuations in the aggregate job-separation
rate. Thus, transition rates involving temporary employment are much more important for
explaining the cyclical movement in unemployment than are the rates involving permanent
jobs. Despite this finding, our results confirm that temporary employment plays a more
important role in job creation than in job destruction. Finally, we find that the positive
contribution of the transition rate from temporary to permanent jobs (Ef − Ep) to unem-
ployment fluctuations fluctuations is cancelled out by the transition rate from permanent to
temporary jobs (Ep − Ef ).
6 Final Remarks
In this paper, we have studied the trends in the aggregate labor market outcomes for the
Spanish economy, from the third quarter of 1987 to the second quarter of 2010. We have com-
puted gross worker flows and transition rates between different states, explicitly considering
the two-tiered nature of the Spanish labor market. We found that 84.4 percent of gross flows
between employment and unemployment involve temporary contracts. While both sides (the
ins and outs) are important for explaining the dynamics of unemployment, at the outset of
periods of economic crisis the separation rate rises while a few quarters later the job finding
rate is seen to fall. This behavior is present in both the current crisis and in that of the
nineties. Moreover, the magnitude of these changes is much greater in temporary jobs than
it is in permanent positions. A comparison of our results for Spain with evidence from the
UK and the US shows that transition rates from unemployment to employment and those
that include unemployment and inactivity are lower in Spain. By contrast, the transition
rate from employment to unemployment is higher in Spain than it is in the UK and the US.
This result would seem to reflect the relatively high overall flexibility of UK and US labor
markets, but at the same time it also captures the high flexibility for those in the temporary
employment in Spain.
As for the business cycle properties of the transition rates, we find a strong and posi-
tive (negative) relationship between and transition rates from unemployment to temporary
employment (from temporary employment to unemployment) over the business cycle. These
results are consistent with the fact that firms use fixed-term contracts as the main mechanism
for hiring and firing workers.
In the three-state set-up, we find that fluctuations in the transition rates from unemploy-
ment to employment and from employment to unemployment account for roughly 35 and 33
percent of the fluctuations in the unemployment rate, respectively. As such, our results indi-
cate that both sides (creation and destruction) are important when explaining unemployment
rate volatility. When we explicitly consider the employment duality (four-state set-up), we
find that almost 80 percent of movements between unemployment and employment involve
a transition to temporary employment. More specifically, our findings show that the transi-
tion rate from unemployment to temporary employment accounts for all of the contribution
of the aggregate job finding rate to the fluctuations in the unemployment rate. Moreover,
the transition rate from temporary jobs to unemployment is responsible for more than 60
percent of the fluctuations in the aggregate job separation rate. Thus, transition rates that
include temporary employment seem to hold the key to understanding the cyclical movement
in Spain’s unemployment rate.
Our study provides empirical evidence of worker flows in a two-tier labor market. Specif-
ically, it stresses the importance of transition rates that involve temporary jobs, as it is these
that seem to account for unemployment volatility. To some extent, our results could be con-
sidered a point of reference for researchers who seek to explain unemployment fluctuations
in similar dual labor markets.
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